By Maj Gen Neeraj Bali (Retd)
When Joe Biden became the President, he inherited a looming US withdrawal from Afghanistan to signal the finish of the 20-year war that consumed 2400 American lives with out displaying a clear win in return. Remember that Henry Kissinger had pointed out that a ‘guerilla wins if it does not lose’. Conventional armies do not have that luxury. The history of this war will undoubtedly note that the US did not wipe out the militants, failed to usher in a steady and functioning democracy, eradicate the opium trade or assure equality for girls.
Arguably, Biden had no other viable policy choices for a manoeuvre other than to announce a withdrawal. The new administration was fast to announce that all 3500 US troops would pull out by September 11, the anniversary of the attack on the twin towers and Pentagon. NATO also followed suit.
The selection was a adhere to-up of the Trump government’s headlong plunge to sign a deal at Doha with the Taliban that paved the way for the extraction of all forces by May 1. The agreed terms of the agreement smelt of desperation and expediency. The US negotiators sidelined the Afghan government and ignored various professionals who warned that though the provisions held the US feet to fire more than precise deliverables, the Taliban only had to make vague counterterrorism promises in return. The US did not insist on instituting even a mechanism to confirm compliance by the Taliban.
When General Austin Miller, the NATO Forces Commander, confronted the Taliban more than continuing violence, the latter had famously retorted that “the Islamic Emirate has not committed itself to any such undertaking.” The reality is that in the aftermath of the Doha agreement, the Taliban have killed more than 500 civilians, mainly targeting the elite, in attacks that have made use of ‘sticky bombs’. The Taliban have in some cases blamed the Pakistan-supported Haqqani network for these attacks, a claim that seems specious. Indeed, the Taliban have continued blood-letting at will and only conceded not attacking the US forces.
The US-Taliban agreement stipulated that the Taliban would renounce Al Qaeda. Not only is it unclear if that will occur, but Al Qaeda has also welcomed the Doha pact with unconcealed glee due to the fact it would outcome in seeing the backs of the US military energy.
Analysts are united in believing that the future below a Taliban dispensation does not augur properly for peace and stability of the nation and the area. The Taliban have not shown the slightest modify of heart due to the fact they lost energy in 2001. Many of the prospective leaders in a Taliban government have spent years in captivity in Guantánamo and are unlikely to shed their trauma to turn a new leaf.
The Taliban influence has quickly expanded from the countryside to urban centres. The emerging circumstance portends a reversal of the fragile gains of education, governance, healthcare, education, and women’s empowerment created below Karzai and Ashraf Ghani dispensations’ tutelage. The 300,000 powerful Afghan Army has heavily leaned on the US forces for omnibus assistance. Bereft of that umbrella, it is not anticipated to present a formidable bulwark against a Taliban rise for extended.
The situation presents a debilitating shrinking of choices for India. Over the previous two decades, India has steadfastly opposed any parleys with the Taliban. Lately, it seems that the Indian foreign affairs establishment has readjusted its position to accommodate the new reality. Recently speaking in Tajikistan, the External Affairs minister S. Jaishankar supported talks among the Afghan government and the Taliban. The advantage to India from such an interaction among the incumbent Afghan government and the Taliban is clear. Successive Afghan governments have shown an affinity for India in sharp contrast to their orientation towards Pakistan. It is axiomatic that if the Afghan government arrives at a appropriate arrangement with the Taliban for the post-American reality, India will continue to have a foot into the door to safeguard its interests.
The US viewpoint also favours India’s interests it has encouraged an UN-backed work with multilateral participation of China, Iran, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the U.S. India has supported this method. But as far as a connection with the Taliban goes, India has been a backbencher. The US, China, Russia and Pakistan have all reached out to the Taliban with varying degrees of influence and results. The Europeans, also, have signalled interest. India has been dependent on the results of its ‘allies’ – the US and the existing Afghan government. And needless to add, it faces formidable opposition from Pakistan.
India has a strategic stake in Afghanistan’s future. A friendly-to-neutral Afghanistan obviates the ‘strategic depth’ of the Pakistani military establishment’s dreams. Over the years, India has invested a terrific deal in infrastructure, education, energy generation and irrigation improvement. These efforts had been created at terrific human and financial sacrifice. India has the mandate to create the Shahtoot dam close to Kabul. Afghanistan was amongst the initial nations to obtain the anti-Covid vaccine from India. Our strategic ties with the government of the day are as powerful as ever.
Yet, our strategic, safety and financial interests seem to be at the mercy of unfolding events rather than our intervention. Possible failures of the talks among the Taliban and the Afghan government, the reneging of the terms of the Doha accord by the Taliban, and the emergence of an Islamic Khalifat-style governments are not far-fetched doomsday scenarios. Each one of these is pregnant with dark possibilities for India’s interests.
In narrowing our choices, an work to engage the Taliban might be the only course that could defend our interests. That is the urgent demand for realpolitik. Given the decades of our history – or the lack of it – with the Taliban, this path will under no circumstances be straightforward to embark upon, considerably much less succeed. It might also be also late to make that work. And but, even at this late stage, that might properly be a door we ought to knock. Our policy therefore far has been to assistance precise groups. But Aimal Faizi, an Afghan journalist and ex-director of communications to the former President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, has lately encouraged, “India should be focused on the entire Afghan polity, not particular groups.” He says that the Taliban are a reality, and India would do properly to engage with them openly.
The sobering reality is that all the other options are unpleasant and harmful. And status quo is hardly the answer due to the fact, as a person mentioned in jest, ‘quo has already lost all status’.
(The author is an Indian Army veteran. Email [email protected]. Twitter gen_bali Views expressed are private and do not reflect the official position or policy of TheSpuzz Online.)