By Brig Akhelesh Bhargava (Retd)
Among the several threats that our nation witnesses, internal threat by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is one that has been simmering for lengthy. Over the decades, our Paramilitary Forces (PMF) have been provided a absolutely free hand to equip themselves with enhanced weapons and assistance technologies, as needed to combat the Naxals in Central India. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) raised Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), to combat the Naxals but time and once again the force has suffered at the hands of these Naxals.
The most lethal fighting unit of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), Battalion No. 1 headed by Madvi Hidma has its base in Bastar Division. The Gondi speaking tribes residing in the dense forest of Bastar, Dantewada, Sukma, Bijapur, Narayanpur, Kanker and Kondagaon are recognized to be exploited by the Naxals. The Naxals are adapt in living off the land and have grow to be a messiah to these tribes in the absence of governance and improvement. Further the terrain is best for hit and run and Naxals have adapted to the techniques surprising the forces at will. CRPF, the lead agency for anti-Naxal operations, has suffered several setbacks at the hands of the Maoists.
On the evening of April 2, about 1900 plus safety personnel left their camps in Tarrem, (Bijapur district of Bastar Division), for an operation. The multi-force group incorporated males from the state police’s Special Task Force (STF), the District Reserve Guard (DRG), the Bastar Battalion and the CRPF’s CoBRAs. The operation was planned against Maoist commander, Madvi Hidma, mastermind of numerous ambushes. The arranging for operation was apparently performed by IG Operations Nalin Prabhat, IPS. He was DIG through the April 2010 massacre of 76 CRPF personnel in Dantewada.
The operation has been analysed by several and an right after-action report will also be submitted. Four new camps (equivalent of business operating base or COB) had been established by the forces, months preceding the operation. The forces had been anticipated to carry out location domination by patrolling on distinctive routes and having to know their respective location of duty (AOR). Middle rung officers had been supposed to accompany the platoon and business size forces for such activity. A log of such activity need to be obtainable if it was performed at all. The media could attain the sight, prior to the forces could retrieve their martyrs. How come, they could not locate any Maoist casualty, even though the DG CRPF claim that a massive quantity of Maoist had been also killed. If the force strength was so significant, a counter attack need to have been launched albeit if the leadership was present on ground. For such an operation, handful of Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) need to have been deployed, foreseeing such an eventuality (taking a cue from the previous) to get behind the Maoist and encounter them from the rear. Apparently, there had been none. The withdrawal from operations web site need to have been bound to bound in little parties maintaining ones back covered. The males had been possibly in terrific hurry to get back to secure confines of their camp – clearly reflecting that the senior leadership was not in manage and had left the personnel to their fate.
The availability of drones, jammers, snooping devices, satellite imagery, et all is obtainable in the nation. When an operation of this size was becoming planned, was the employment of these gadgets to provide genuine time image to junior leadership on ground deemed? Looks like this was overlooked as well!
The release ceremony of the captured CRPF commando in front of the large gathering of villagers and the photo-ops is a terrific demoraliser. Hope it is avenged quickly. For that to come about, the CRPF hierarchy and the Indian Police Service (IPS) officers have to carry out some introspection. Some ideas that need to be incorporated are listed under:
Administrative Aspects: CRPF need to move total battalion to operational place rather of just the operating corporations. The battalion headquarters are hundreds of miles away from ground realities. The Battalion Commander (60 to 70 % IPS) is disconnected from the troops on ground. He need to lead from the front rather than from the precincts of his workplace. The administrative needs of the troops deployed in intense operational atmosphere are a a lot like suitable relief arranging. In the Bilaspur Division Gondi language is spoken. By now CRPF need to have a sizeable quantity of Gondi speaking troops to act as interpreters. Basic understanding of the language need to be compulsory for all officers posted in the area.
Operational :The major hierarchy although arranging operation at such massive scale need to keep in AOR for considerable time, stroll on foot to see the ground realities and not rely on intelligence which is weeks old. A grid of business sized camps be established in Naxal prone regions to give a honey-comb impact. Just a handful of camps which are far spread, will not reap a great deal support. Company officers need to keep inside camps and not in rest homes. They need to have tenures of minimum two years in operational location and know their males in detail. The camps need to be positioned inside the AOR and troops need to carry out location domination in a random manner.
Tactics: When troops move for an operation, they need to under no circumstances keep close to villages as they are usually infested with more than ground workers (OGW) and they act as ears and eyes for Naxals. Small teams are superior than single massive one and they need to operate from numerous path. Thorough use of navigational aids, fantastic inter group communication with provision for continuous surveillance and intelligence inputs need to be ensured. Route out and route in need to be distinctive as to mislead the Naxals. Post operations the troops are fatigued, sleepy and restless and thus calls for further caution. Higher ground has a definite benefit in a fire fight and thus it is a must that troops need to opt for routes along higher ground or atleast have their spotters at vantage points. When a massive force is becoming deployed, surprise is compromised due to noise element. Diversionary operations would preserve the Naxals guessing relating to the genuine intentions of the forces. A handful of QRTs at important place have to be earmarked to act as reinforcement as nicely as get behind the Naxals and hit them from a further path.
Post Ambush: It is recognized that the principal job of Naxals is to inflict maximum casualties on the forces and secondary job is to capture maximum arms and ammunition and live to fight a further day. However, previous records show that the CRPF personnel under no circumstances make an try to counter-strike the Naxals in the act of ‘looting weapons’.
Technology: With the availability of higher-resolution drone and helicopter mounted cameras in the nation, sufficient genuine time surveillance need to be supplied prior to such a enormous operation. For distinct periods, sources such as battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs), satellite imagery, and jammer detachments need to be produced obtainable and utilised innovatively.
Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB) (Madhya Bharat): Based on the ‘son of the soil’ idea, Madhya Bharat IRB Battalion need to be raised to help CRPF. These battalions have to recruit males from the Naxal infested regions. The males need to be educated to operate in deeper jungles of Bilaspur Division and related areas.
Accountability: The failure of operations will certainly be studied by the chain of command. It is crucial to pin point duty to prevent several more fiascos that may well come about in the future. In the immediate case, leaving the martyrs behind and reporting them as missing, is a ‘recipe for promoting poor leadership’ and desires to be ‘nipped in the bud’.
What occurred in Tarrem, Bijapur need to not be repeated once again. It is time that the strategy to avenge the act in a swift time frame need to be place in location, for the ‘CoBRAs’ to salvage their image and sting.
(The author is Indian Army Veteran. Views expressed are individual and do not reflect the official position or policy of TheSpuzz Online.)